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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CITY OF SALT LAKE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 9990876 vs. 
KEITH ROBERTS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
oooOooo 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) U.C.A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. When a person makes reasonable efforts to avoid being 
seen by others, and exposes his genitals in his automobile, has he 
willfully exposed himself in a place open to public view as defined 
by Salt Lake City ordinance? The issue was preserved for appeal by 
Defendant's trial Memorandum (R. 16-34) and at trial (Tr. 26-30). 
This is a question of statutory construction to be reviewed for 
correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court's 
decision. See Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 
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(Utah 1989). Insofar as the issue depends on the sufficiency of 
the evidence to meet the requirements of the ordinance, Defendant 
must marshall the evidence in favor of Plaintiff and show that it 
is not sufficient. In re Beasley, 883 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT ISSUE 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City: 
11.16.100. Urinating in Public and Other Disorderly Conduct. 
It shall be unlawful for any person, while in a place open to 
public view, to willfully: 
A. Urinate or stool; 
B. Engage in sexual conduct, alone or with another person or 
an animal; 
C. Make an intentional exposure of his or her genitals, 
pubic area, buttocks or any portion of the areola and/or nipple of 
the female breast; 
D. Exhibit the private parts of any horse, bull, or other 
animal in a state of sexual stimulation, or to exhibit such animals 
in the act of sexual copulation. (Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: 
prior code § 32-2-5) 
§ 76-9-702. U.C.A. Lewdness -- Gross Lewdness. 
(1) A person is guilty of lewdness if the person under 
circumstances not amounting to rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, 
forcible sexual abuse, aggravated sexual assault, or an attempt to 
commit any of these offenses, performs an act of sexual intercourse 
or sodomy, exposes his or her genitals or private parts, 
masturbates, engages in trespassory voyeurism, or performs any 
other act of lewdness in a public place or under circumstances 
which the person should know will likely cause affront or alarm to, 
on, or in the presence of another who is 14 years of age or older. 
(2) Lewdness is a class B misdemeanor. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Ndl:uj,:tr« of Case 
This is an appeal from a judgment and order of conviction in 
which Defendant was convicted in the Third District Court for Salt 
Lake County of the crime of disorderly conduct pursuant to 
§ 11.16.100 of the Salt Lake City code. The judgment of conviction 
was entered mi • U), 1999 .mri Hie notice of appeal was filed 
on September 1, .- -
Defendant was tried before the court, moved to dismiss the 
charge against him, at., the conclusion of Plaintiff's case. He did 
so on the grounds that the evidence introduced did not, as a matter 
of law, constitute a violation of the cited Section of the Salt 
Lake City Code. He had previously filed a tr ial brief :I i I which 
Defendant claimed that his conduct did not fall under the terms of 
the ordinal ice :i n that 1 le di ci not, as a matter ui law, intentionally 
expose himself in a place open to public view. 
Statement of Facts 
On or abc n it J i i] } 9 ! \ ' 9 S , at aboi it 8 i 4 5 PM Sa] t I iake City 
vice officers observed a person they alleged was a "known 
prostitute" on State Street (Tr. 7) , They observed Defendant stop 
his vehicle nearby; arid tl le woman enter ed the vehicle (Tr. 8) . 
First Defendant drove to another location under a viaduct, an area 
which the officer claimed was "one of our more popular places" 
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where people park in the hope of being unobserved (Tr. 9) . On this 
occasion, however, there was a marked police car in the area, and 
"I think it spooked them" id. For whatever reason, Defendant 
drove to the location at 1860 South 900 West where he pulled into 
a back parking lot of a business (Tr. 11) . Even though it was 
summer, it was certainly getting dark by this time. Defendant 
parked his car behind a couple of parked flat bed trucks in the 
very rear area of the lot id. The officers "parked in front of the 
bar so they couldn't see our car and we snuck around on foot and 
approached the car on foot." (Tr. 10). Officer Anthony Russell 
crawled underneath one of the flatbeds to get a look at what was 
going on (Tr. 12). He indicated he observed the woman expose her 
breast and Defendant "put his mouth to her breasts, . . .and that's 
when I approached the car from the back" (Tr. 15). He approached 
the car and "I went up to her window and knocked on her window, 
with my badge out and identified myself." (Tr. 16). He observed 
Defendant writh his penis exposed, and in the process of "doing up 
his pants". id. 
The second officer, Shawn Player, walked to the front of the 
trailer behind which Defendant had parked. From where he was, 
Officer Player saw: " . . . the top of the defendant's car and two 
heads." (Tr. 25). While he was not far from Defendant's vehicle, 
he saw nothing of the activity described by the other officer id. 
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The area in which Defendant parked his car was bordered on one 
side by a two-sL'.u/ ' under Lluek wa 1 L \ I'I . 0 . On t.he second side 
was a chain link fence and another closed business, and on the 
third side were parked two flatbed trucks (Tr. 14, 20) . On direct 
examination, Officer Russell described the accessibility of the 
area: 
I mean, they were they were somewhat hidden from this truck, 
I mean, they're not going to go park, you know, in someone's 
driveway; but while we were interviewing them after, right in 
here there was numerous people coming from the bar and getting 
into their trucks and leaving, so this gave them a little--
this flat bed gave them a little bit of hiding room, but yeah, 
you can walk back there, just like I did. 
On cross-examination, officer Russell's testimony added the 
following: 
Q. Okay, So people were coming out of the bar? 
A. Yeah, in the parking lot. 
Q. Al 1 right. Ai ly • : • f thei n c i:aw] i nide i: t: he t ruc k t o see 
what was going on? 
A. No. 
Q. And--and you give me a strange look. That, in fact, 
would be a fairly strange thing for people to do, wouldn't it? 
To crawl under a truck to see what's going on? 
A. If y en i' i e not a vice officer, maybe. 
Q: Officer, did you think in any manner that this defendant 
was attempting to show off his penis in public? Trying to 
show the -- the public what -- what a nice one he had? 
Ai I think he was picking up a prostitute. 
Q: That's what you think, but you don't have any evidence of 
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that one, do you? 
A: Actually, I have her--her--
Q: Yeah. But she's not here, is she? 
A: No. But I have her interview with me (Tr. 21) 
Defendant was arrested for violation of the Salt Lake City 
disorderly conduct ordinance, which roughly parallels the Utah 
statute on public lewdness. Defendant was convicted of willfully 
exposing his genitals "in a place open to public view". The 
prosecutor claimed that a sex act was also observed, though there 
was no evidence of such behavior. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant was convicted of a violation of a Salt Lake City 
ordinance, prohibiting a person from exposing his genitals "in a 
place open to public view" . Appellant contends that he took 
reasonable efforts to avoid being seen when he allegedly exposed 
himself in his parked car. The ordinance requires the exposure to 
be done both "willfully" and "intentionally"; and Defendant's 
conduct does not meet the requirements of the statute or the Salt 
Lake City ordinance. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT DID NOT INTENTIONALLY EXPOSE HIS GENITALS OR ENGAGE IN 
SEXUAL CONDUCT IN A PLACE OPEN TO PUBLIC VIEW. 
Appellant stands convicted of disorderly conduct in violation 
of § 11.16.100 of the revised ordinances of Salt Lake City. This 
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is not a disorderly conduct case in the usual sense. Disorderly 
conduct i s cie£ ineci b;y 11 i€ • I Jtal 1 State I iegi s 1 at:lire i i i § 7 6 9 1 02 
U.C.A. The State crime by the same name involves activity which is 
"violent, tumultuous, or threatening". Disorderly conduct is 
generally an infraction, unless the person continues to engage in 
the disruptive behavior complained of af-ev being asked to stop. 
The Information :i n t:l i:i s matter, c; .*:>--. ^-nr:rely different type 
of offense: 
Defendant, while in a place open to public view, willfully; 
engaged in sexual conduct, alone or with another person or an 
animal; or, made an intentional exposure of his or her 
genitals, pubic area, buttocks or any portion of the areola 
and/or nipple of the female breast (R. 7 ) . 
Although it is certainly not clear from the Information as to 
what conduct was charged, the City argued at trial that Defendant 
both engaged in sexual conduct and intentionally exposed his 
genitals " i n a p] ace :)pen t: :> pi ibl :i c vi ew " (Ti: 28) . In effect, 
the City ordinance on disorderly conduct is similar to § 76-9-702 
U.C.A. which defines public lewdness. Public lewdness under the 
state statute is also a c 1 a.ss B misdemeanor; and :i t appears Salt 
Lake City has chosen to take a portion of that state statue and 
recodify it as disorderly conduct. The City, in recodifying, 
however, made a minor bi it per I: laps :i mportai it change :i i I wording. 
Whereas the state statute requires the conduct to have occurred "in 
a public place," the City requires : - ~r I •" : :r:; • > public view." 
In finding Defendant »_,..* -, LI.U ^ . *.\ ::: ..- differentiate 
between the "sexual conduct" and the exposure. It is clear, 
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however, that Defendant could not have been found guilty of public 
sexual activity under this ordinance. Apparently, the prosecutor 
was referring to the claim by the officer that he had seen 
Defendant put his mouth over the breast of the woman (Tr. 15) . 
While the ordinance does not define "sexual conduct", the term is 
clearly the same as "sexual activity" as defined by State law: 
§ 76-10-1301 (4) "Sexual activity" means acts of 
masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any sexual act involving 
the genitals of one person and the mouth of anus of another 
person, regardless of the sex of either participant. 
The touching of the woman's breast by Defendant does not 
qualify as "sexual activity" under State law, nor can it be 
included as sexual conduct under the City Code. Thus, it is the 
exposure by Defendant of his genitals in his own automobile which 
constitutes the allegedly illegal act. Only one of the two 
officers observing the vehicle saw anything unusual. Obviously, he 
was determined to do so, to the degree that he crawled under a 
flatbed trailer and approached the car from the rear. He did not 
see the alleged exposure until he went up to the passenger window 
and looked in. 
The Salt Lake ordinance requires "willful" conduct on the part 
of the Defendant. The Utah Code states the following in § 76-2-
103: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect 
to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, 
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
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The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Larsen, 865 P. 2d 1355 
(Utah 1993) added the following: 
An individual must act willfully to be criminally liable under 
the statute. This means that the prosecution must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused "desire[d] to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-103. This highly culpable mental state is not consistent 
with "strict liability," as that term is traditionally used. 
865 P.2d at 1360. 
It is perhaps unfortunate that this court will have to rely on 
"word pictures" presented by the prosecution witnesses, without the 
diagrams made at trial and shown to the trial court. Defense 
counsel expressed some concern about the fact that the diagrams 
were not being preserved (Tr.10). Nevertheless, they were not. 
The "word pictures", however, do preserve the general 
circumstances. Defendant parked in relatively remote place, 
deliberately behind other large vehicles, and against a blank 
concrete wall. The officers "snuck" to the general area before 
crawling under a truck. In his testimony, officer Russell stated 
"you can walk back there, just like I did." Obviously, the point 
is that a casual passerby could not walk back there in the manner 
that the officer did. First, he would not "sneak" up. Secondly, 
he would not crawl under a truck. When officer Russell went to the 
window of the car, he claims to have seen Defendant exposed, but 
"he was doing up his pants". It seems fairly obvious that 
Defendant was not "intentional" in the "exposure of his genitals"; 
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nor did he act "willfully", "while in a place open to public view". 
The instant case is very similar to that of State v. Broad, 
600 P.2d 1379, 61 Haw. 187 (Haw. 1979): 
The only testimony at trial was that offered by the two 
arresting officers. The officers first observed appellant on 
Maunakea Street at about 3:00 a.m. on November 14, 1976, a 
Sunday morning. The two officers had been patrolling the 
downtown area when they saw appellant and a number of other 
individuals flagging vehicles to the side of the street. The 
officers watched appellant as he stopped an automobile and 
after a brief conversation with its driver entered the 
vehicle. The officers followed the car to Waikahalulu Lane 
where they found it parked on top of a hill, in a turnaround 
area opposite a residence at Waikahalulu Lane. It was then 
approximately 3:30 a.m. and the car was stationed between two 
street lights. There were no other lights from any of the 
nearby houses nor were any inhabitants awake at this time. 
The officers parked their cars behind appellant's car and got 
out. As they approached his car at a point about five to six 
feet away they saw appellant's head in the driver's lap moving 
up and down. Believing some form of sexual conduct was taking 
place, one of the officers turned on his flashlight, directed 
it into the car, and observed appellant and the driver engaged 
in the act of fellatio. At this point the officers arrested 
appellant, charging him with open lewdness in violation of HRS 
§ 712-1217. 600 P.2d at 1380. 
At the end of the case by the prosecution, Defendant moved for 
a judgment of acquittal: 
Appellant's motion for a judgment of acquittal was based on 
the prosecution's failure to produce sufficient evidence that 
appellant's act on Waikahalulu Lane occurred in a public place 
where he was likely to be seen by casual observers. This 
point constituted a crucial element of the prosecution's 
prima facie case and at this stage of the proceedings had not 
been established. 600 P.2d at 1380. 
After reviewing the law on a public place in the State of 
Hawaii, the court held that the observed actions had not occurred 
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in a public place: 
The evidence presented by the officers at trial revealed that 
no persons other than the police officers saw appellant. And 
they themselves would not have seen him had they not followed 
him from Maunakea Street. In Rocker, appellants were seen by 
other citizens who then telephoned the police. Here on the 
other hand, appellant's car was found parked on top of a hill 
turnaround in a dead end. Although the road was in a 
residential area, the sole evidence offered as to the nature 
of the neighborhood was that there was one house across the 
street. The house was dark: no evidence of any inhabitants 
asleep or awake was introduced. No evidence of any pedestrian 
or vehicular traffic on the lane was offered. Nor were the 
lights of appellant's car on. Although the car was parked 
between two street lights, the officers themselves admitted 
they used flashlights to witness appellant's specific acts. 
It was 3:30 a.m. on a Sunday morning, hardly an hour when 
people would be traversing the street whether it be a busy 
thoroughfare or deserted land. Under these facts and 
circumstances it was improbable that appellant's acts would be 
observed by members of the public. Thus, the district court 
erred in denying appellant's motion for a judgment of 
acquittal. 600 P.2d at 1382. 
Once again, Defendant here made no "willful" effort to be 
seen. In contrast, he made an effort not to be seen doing what the 
officers observed. Defendant was clearly looking for a place where 
he would not be readily observed. Officer Russell acknowledged 
this when he said Defendant first went to a place under a viaduct 
where he had seen others go to avoid being observed. When 
Defendant apparently perceived he might be observed there, he 
moved. And the place they parked was "somewhat hidden". The 
intent not to be observed was also obvious: "they're not going to 
go park, you know, in someone's driveway" (Tr. 17). It did not 
matter where he stopped on this occasion, because the officers were 
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determined to follow and observe him. There was literally no place 
where he could go which the officers would not claim was "open to 
public view". It was only because they followed him, crawled 
under a truck, and rushed at the car, that they were successful in 
seeing what they did. Just as in the Hawaii case, the actions of 
the Defendant were not likely to be seen "by casual observers". 
Because it was "improbable that appellant's acts would be observed 
by members of the public" the acts of Defendant fail to meet the 
ordinance under which Defendant is charged. 
The view of the Court regarding the charge was 
straightforward: 
THE COURT: Well, see I would take the different view. If 
they were at Sugarhouse Park in a parking lot, doing it, that, 
in my mind, is a public place and they ought not to be doing 
it and they have no rights. That's my view. 
MR. DAYNES: Where they're in any public parking lot--
THE COURT: Well, that's the point. 
MR. DAYNES: --committed that crime. It's open to public 
view. 
THE COURT: I think--I think the problem is that the 
language is tough to deal with, but I'm not going to struggle 
with it too much. It was a public parking lot, in my view, it 
was open to public view (Tr. 2 9-3 0). 
The analogy of the court that it would be the same as "if they 
were at Sugarhouse Park in a parking lot" is false. Even in 
Sugarhouse Park, the circumstances must be reviewed. It would have 
to be determined what time of day it was, how many people were 
12 
around, how remote the parking lot was from other people, and other 
factors which might affect the likelihood of being seen by a casual 
passerby. The statement that this area was "a public parking lot" 
is not an adequate assessment of the circumstances. The area 
opened to parking for the bar was on the other side of the trucks. 
The parking area in which this Defendant was located was in an area 
in which bar customers would not park. It is likely that the area 
was used by employees or customers of the building behind (the one 
with the two story high concrete wall) . In fact, there was no 
evidence that this was a "public parking lot". It is just as 
likely that the business owner would have made a trespassing 
complaint against this Defendant, if he had seen him. Such a 
complaint was not made, of course, due to the fact that nobody was 
around to observe him. The incident occurred in the evening, and 
the business had long since closed. The trial court made no 
attempt to review the entire circumstances, simply because the 
trial court misconstrued the language of the ordinance. 
This situation was also faced by the New York State Court of 
Appeals in the case of People v. McNamara, 585 N.E.2d 788, 78 
N.Y.2d 626 (N.Y. 1991). That Court handled four consolidated 
appeals filed by the prosecutor for the City of Buffalo, who was 
attempting to reinstate four Informations which had been dismissed 
as facially insufficient in the Buffalo City Court. The dismissals 
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had been upheld once on appeal by, the Erie County Court. This 
final appeal, by permission, to the State's highest court followed. 
The two lower courts had found that the Informations charging 
public lewdness were facially insufficient. The statute at issue 
stated that a person: 
.is guilty of public lewdness when he intentionally 
exposes intimate parts of his body in a lewd manner or 
commits any other lewd act (a) in a public 
place, . . . . 585 N.E.2d at 789. 
The Informations charged that Cheryl McNamara, Rose Marie 
Terrell, Martyn Hill and Alma Harrison intentionally exposed 
themselves or engaged in sexual intercourse in vehicles parked in 
public places. Specifically, the Information against Ms. McNamara 
stated the "vehicle in which Defendant was seated, was parked in a 
well lit area, and its interior was readily visible to passerbyers 
[sic]." 585 N.E. 2d at 790. 
The New York Court first observed that the term "public place" 
as used in the statute had not been defined by the legislature. 
Neither the term "public place" as used in the Utah statute or the 
term "open to public view" used in the city ordinance have been 
defined. The Court then rejected a definition proposed by the 
State: 
We likewise reject the People's argument that the definition 
of "public place" should be drawn from Fourth Amendment 
decisions holding that there is a diminished expectation of 
privacy in automobiles. Plainly, the existence of a 
diminished expectation of privacy does not transform the 
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interior of an automobile into a "public place." 585 N.E. 2d 
at 791. 
The Court found that the statute was aimed at protecting 
"unsuspecting, unwilling, nonconsenting, innocent, surprised, or 
likely-to-be offended or corrupted types of viewers" id. The State 
of New York argued that conduct which occurred on a public street 
was, by definition, a public place. The Court observed: 
Obviously, places that are public in a property sense may be 
very private in terms of the likelihood of casual observation. 
Though both may be "public," for example, the interior of a 
vehicle parked on the side of a desolate road is not a "public 
place" in the same sense that the interior of a car parked at 
a busy downtown shopping area might be. And between these two 
examples exist a wide variety of locales that may be 
classified as more or less "public." 
Because the term "public place" has no cut-and-dried meaning, 
it is necessary to interpret and apply the statute here in a 
manner that comports with its purpose. As been observed in 
the analogous context, since "the rationale of this provision 
is to prevent the open flouting of societal conventions, it 
should not condemn as debouchers of public morality persons 
who desire privacy and who take reasonable measures to secure 
it. " (Model Penal Code and Commentaries, part II, § 2 51.1, 
comment 2, at 452 [ALI 1980].) 
That a member of the public may pass by is certainly part of 
the essence of a public place, and the harm to such a person's 
sensibilities is precisely that aimed at by the statute. 
Conversely, where no such harm is likely, the statute is not 
violated. We therefore conclude that the interior of a parked 
vehicle is a "public place" for purposes of this subdivision 
where the objective circumstances establish that lewd acts 
committed there can, and likely would, be seen by the casual 
passerby, whose sensibility the statute seeks to protect. 
Thus, the interior of a vehicle parked at a stated address is 
not itself a "public place, " but it may become one under 
circumstances indicating that the car's interior is visible to 
a member of the passing public, and that the vehicle is 
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situated in a place where it likely would be observed by such 
a person. 
Applying this definition to the facts at hand, it is clear 
that none of the informations before us describes a "public 
place" under the statute. Emphasis added. 585 N.E.2d at 792-3. 
The New York Court observed that the attempt of the Buffalo 
police to use this ordinance against the various Defendants was 
apparently an attempt to criminalize consensual sodomy. The Utah 
police officer admitted in court that he did not believe there was 
intent on the part of the Defendant to be seen. It seems fairly 
clear from the circumstances that reasonable efforts were made by 
Defendant to avoid just such an observation. The officer, however, 
believed that he had caught the Defendant soliciting sexual conduct 
in violation of State and City prostitution laws. The problem, of 
course, is that the officer was unprepared to prove those 
allegations. He thus, in exasperation, did exactly what the 
Buffalo City Prosecutor did. He stretched, and found an ordinance 
that almost worked. This is simply misuse of the ordinance. It 
cannot be stretched to include the behavior at issue here. This is 
not what the statute was designed to prohibit. A policeman acting 
as a "peeping Tom" might observe any number of things if he sneaks 
up and looks through windows. Neither the State of Utah nor the 
City of Salt Lake has authorized him to do so. 
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POINT II 
THIS COURT MAY NOT EXPAND THE DEFINITION OF "PLACE OPEN TO PUBLIC 
VIEW" OR "SEXUAL CONDUCT" IN ORDER TO CONVICT DEFENDANT. 
There is, of course, some difference in wording between terms 
in the State statute and the City ordinance. The most significant 
difference is in the terms "sexual conduct" as opposed to "sexual 
activity" and the terms "open to public view" as opposed to "public 
place". The Courts of this State have ruled that areas of law that 
are regulated by the State may not be regulated by the City in an 
inconsistent manner. See Salt Lake City v. Allredf 20 Utah 2d 298, 
437 P.2d 434 (Utah 1968); Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County 
Commission, 624 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981); Richfield City v. Walker, 
790 P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990); and Walker v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
844 P.2d 335 (Utah App. 1992) . Therefore, the City cannot adopt 
a broader definition than has the State of Utah for either "public 
place" or "sexual conduct". Appellant contends, as he did at 
trial (R. 17) that the term "open to public view" is more 
restricted than the term "public place". Whereas a car might be 
parked in a public place, conduct within it might not be open to 
public view. The alleged exposure of Defendant's genitalia 
occurred in such a way that Officer Player could not see it, though 
he did try. It was only seen by Officer Russell by going up to the 
window and looking in. The term requires more for conviction than 
the one in McNamara. It is sufficient under the New York statute 
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(and under Utah law, which is virtually identical), that a person 
take reasonable measures to avoid being seen. It is clearly 
sufficient under this ordinance as well. 
The term "sexual conduct" is likewise no broader than the 
similar term in State law. There was no sexual conduct, as there 
was no sexual activity. The city may suggest that the Salt Lake 
City ordinance really is more broad than State law; but cannot do 
so successfully. 
It goes almost without saying that ordinances which are so 
vague that they cannot be easily understood by someone trying to 
comply with them are void for vagueness. Enforcement of ordinances 
which are unconstitutionally vague are in violation of the due 
process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah. 
See State v. Lindquist, 674 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1983) and In re: Boyer, 
636 P. 2d 1085 (Utah 1981) . The law in Salt Lake City, as in 
everywhere else in the State of Utah on what is and is not sexual 
activity, is the same and is uniform. The Constitution says that. 
The State Legislature says that. Salt Lake City has no right to 
say anything else. 
The California Supreme Court had an opportunity to construe 
the term "lewd or dissolute conduct" in the case of Pryor v. 
Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d.238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal.Rptr. 330 
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(Cal. 1979). In that case, the Defendant claimed that this term 
was unconstitutionally vague. The court, in reply stated: 
We agree with defendant that the phrase "lewd or dissolute 
conduct" as construed by past decisions is unconstitutionally 
vague. If, however, we can reasonably construe the statute to 
conform with the mandate of specificity, we should not, and 
will not, declare the enactment unconstitutional. 25 Cal.3d 
at 244. 
State Appellant Courts have inherent power to construe 
statutes and ordinances, and if necessary, narrow their 
interpretation to avoid unconstitutionality. It is likely that the 
city will ask this court for a broad interpretation of the terms 
which are undefined. If, however, that broad interpretation is 
given, the ordinance is in conflict with State Law and is void. A 
broad definition of the terms might also make the law 
unconstitutionally vague. A broad interpretation of the terms of 
the ordinance sufficient to find Defendant guilty would deny 
Defendant a fair warning of what conduct was proscribed by law. It 
goes almost without saying that ordinances which are so vague that 
they can not be easily understood by someone trying to comply with 
them are void for vagueness. See State v. Lindquist, 674 P. 2d 1234 
(Utah 1983) and In re Bover, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981) . The clear 
language of the ordinance in question parallels that of the State 
Statute, which only prohibits conduct in a place where casual 
passersby are likely to see. It only prohibits conduct 
specifically described as sexual activity and indecent exposure 
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within the terms of the statute. The city can only prevail by 
twisting the language to a degree where it makes no sense. This 
court should not extend the law as requested. The City drafted the 
ordinance; and it appears clear what the purpose was. If the City 
has additional concerns not addressed by the ordinance, it 
certainly can pass a new one. What it cannot do is re-interpret an 
existing ordinance to destroy its plain meaning, in an attempt to 
convict someone of a crime on inadequate evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The ordinance under which Defendant was convicted in the lower 
court does not prohibit the conduct proved against Defendant. In 
the alternative, the ordinance is so vague in failing to define its 
terms, thait it violates Defendant's rights to due process of Law, 
and cannot be so enforced against him. The District Court finding 
of Guilt must be reversed, and the case dismissed. 
DATED this day of December, 1999. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. 
W. Andrew McCullough * 
Attorney for Appellant 
20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Q * day of December, 1999, I 
hand delivered two true and correct copies of Appellant's Brief to 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor, attorney for Appellee, 349 South 200 
East, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
(j£L ftCUel _ 
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IN THE THIRD DIS'l'KKJ'l L.UUKT 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
A Municipal Corporation 
vs. 
KEITH W ROBERTS 
D.O.B. 08/29/42 
DEFENDANT 
STATE OF UTAH 
City and County of Salt Lake 
CO ,,« \3 
INFORMATION 
Court Case 
Police Case 99136705 
Citation 
Judge 9919/ffz^Mi. 
SS 
THE UNDERSIGNED of Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah on behalf of said City, on oath complains that the above 
name defendant whose other and true name is to complainant unknown, 
of Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake and State of Utah on or abou 
07/09/99 2 0:4E5, at Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake and state 
aforesaid did commit the public offense of 
VIOLATING THE SALT LAKE CITY CODE, as follows, to-wit: 
COUNT I: Disorderly Conduct 
Defendant, while in a place open to public view, willfully; engaged in 
sexual conduct, alone or with another person or an animal; or, made an 
intentional exposure of his or her genitals, pubic area, buttocks or 
any portion of the areola and/or nipple of the female-breast. A Class 
B misdemeanor. 
IN VIOLATION OF SALT LAKE CITY CODE, SECTION 11.16.100 
All counts located at approximately 900 W 1860 S 
Complainant JUL 13 1999 
Dat 
tf'th-44 
ity Prosecutor 
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Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
450 South State Street, P.O. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT/ORDER 
Criminal/Traffic 
(CTTY/bTATE 
-VS-
Plaintiff Case Number 
Tape number C # 
Date g - \ 3 g - 9 9 Time 
Kir/ rn U) • 
Defendant 
Judge/Comm WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Clerk mntAGLii--
DOB: / / 
Interpreter 
Plaintiff Counsel. 
fJHARfiFS'HD \Sao o&cuLy Co^inurT 
Defense Counsel 
Amended 
Amended 
THE COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS: 
O OAW£ (1) Jail 
Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence 
(2) Fine Amt. $ Susp. $ 
Suspended _ 
Fee$. Fine Bal $. 
Payment Schedule: Pay $_ 
(3) Court Costs $ 
per month/1 st Pmt. Due 
TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $ 
Last Pmt. Due 
through QDHOT- 11-30 -9? (4) Community Service/WP *3o \Aai LO< 
(5) Restitution $ Pay to: • Court • Victim • Show Proof to Court 
Attorney Fees $ 
(6) Probation / $L ma Mr*** EfGood Behavior • AP&P • ACEC • Other 
(7) Terms of probation: 
Further Violations • Counseling thru. 
• AA Meetings 
• Follow Program 
• No Alcohol 
• Antibuse 
• Employment — 
• Proof of 
./wk. ./month • Classes. 
• In/Out Treatment. 
• Health Testing 
• Crime Lab Procedure 
• 
• 
(8) Plea in Abeyance Diversion 
(9) Review / / at _ 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third District 
Court at 238-7391, at least three working days prior to the proceeding. 
APPEAL MUST RF Fll FD WITHIN 3n DAYS OF .l imrtFMFNT 
€^Uc ZiJ. A 
Dis^ict Court Jydcte 
^r„ * i L 
